Russian minorities as a factor of regional integration
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Date: Tue, 6 Apr 1999 11:41:51 +0300 (EET DST)
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Subject: Russian minorities as a factor of regional integration
From: MINELRES moderator <[email protected]>
Original sender: Pal Kolsto <[email protected]>
Russian minorities as a factor of regional integration
QUESTIONNAIRE TO NATIONALITY POLICY EXPERTS IN THE POST-SOVIET STATES
'The Russian diaspora a factor of regional integration?'
Dear friends and colleagues,
for some time I have been studying the integration of Russian and
Russophone minorities into the non-Russian Soviet successor states. In
a minor follow-up study I will look at the
Russian-minorities-vs.-integration issue from a somewhat different
angle, integration not within states this time, but among and between
states: namely the role these groups can play in the regional
integration among the new states in the former Soviet Union. If in the
first perspective the Russians are perhaps primarily viewed as passive
objects acted upon by others, then in this new perspective they are
regarded as (potentially) active contributors to larger political
processes.
Perhaps this perspective is completely barren. Possibly, my conclusion
will be that neither the Russian minorities themselves, nor their
states of residence or Russia, foresee any such active role for the
local Russians. Or even worse: they may turn out to be a factor which
complicates integration between the Soviet successor states. However,
before I draw this somber conclusion, I would like to hear your
viewpoints on the questions I have included in my questionnaire below.
Please write in your answers in the open space if you have any, and
leave it blank if you don't have any viewpoint on the particular
issue.
***
1. The fact that Russians are generally excluded from top jobs in the
state administration etc. in the new states will prompt them to look
for other sources of livelihood, such as business. Some observers have
suggested that given the fact that Russians are well represented in
all Soviet successor states they may establish strong economic
networks among themselves and to the business community in Russia.
Do you think this is a likely scenario?_________________________
Have you seen any evidence of this taking place already?
_________________________
If you answer 'yes' to any of the above questions, do you think that
the repair of the economic ties between the former Soviet republics
(which of course were very strong in the Soviet era) may entail also
stronger political ties among them in the long run?
_________________________
1b. A variety of this scenario will see the Russians as particularly
will placed to be engaged also in cross-border smuggling, illegal arms
trades, drug traffic, etc.
Do you think this is a likely scenario?_________________________
If you answer 'yes' to this question, do you then believe that the
transborder economic activities of Russian businessmen-cum-criminals
in the various Soviet successor states may instead lead to greater
disintegration among these states (more border guards, greater state
effort to shield themselves off from the neighboring states, etc.)?
_________________________
2. There is one historical parallel which I find intriguing: Up until
Word War II and the Holocaust Jews were well represented in all East
European states and had strong (personal, cultural and economic)
networks among themselves. At the same time, they had weak territorial
attachment to any particular area or country. Some historians have
suggested that this transnational Jewish culture was one of the main
reasons why it was possible to speak about a common 'East European
culture' at all.
If you agree to this assessment, do you then think that the Russians
in the former Soviet republics can play a similar role in the
post-Soviet space, with strong personal, cultural and economic
networks among themselves?
_________________________
2b. If not the Russians as an ethnic community, then perhaps Russian
culture and the Russian language can play an integrative role? All
people who grew up in the Soviet Union - and that includes all the
elites in the successor states - were exposed to strong dozes of
Russian culture and the Russian language. Can this common cultural
heritage be a basis for future integration among the successor states
in the years to come?
_________________________
2c. Or, perhaps the opposite is true: Russian culture is so strongly
associated with Soviet oppression and the condescending attitudes of
the 'big brother' that no new integration is possible before another
culture medium (English, for instance?) can function as the 'language
of interethnic and inter-state communication?
_________________________
3. The perspective from Moscow:
Some Russian political observers (Sergei Karaganov as the most famous)
has suggested that the Russians communities abroad are valuable assets
which the Russian state ought to make active use of in its policy
towards the other Soviet successor states. What they mean by this is
not quite clear to me: Either it can mean that they will provide
Russia with a good excuse to interfere in the internal affairs of
these state under the pretext of protecting the rights of the local
Russians or (less menacing) the local Russians can promote the
interests of the Russian state by voting for pro-Russian parties in
the local elections, lobbying for Russia's strategic and economic
interests, etc. Either way, the local Russians can be seen as
promoters of post-Soviet integration.
Do you see this scenario as likely?
_________________________
3b Or perhaps the very fact that some people in Moscow think along
these lines may provoke a reaction and a backlash: The local Russians
are seen as potential fifth columnists that must be kept out of
politics and position of influence, no matter what?
_________________________
4. The perspective from the capitals of the new states:
Perhaps the state authorities in the non-Russian states will conclude
that they may successfully make use of their Russian citizens in the
promotion of their state interests abroad, in particular in Russia?
This could take various forms:
4a. They can flash the diaspora card in order to extort economic
concessions from Russia. For instance, whenever Russia demands that
they pay their substantial arrears for Russian oil and gas deliveries,
they complain that these demands will lead to economic hardships which
allegedly will hit the Russian minority particularly hard.
Have you observed any such cases?
_________________________
4b. Or they could assign ethnic Russians whose loyalty they trust as
ambassadors to Russia, etc. These diplomats will know how to 'deal
with the Russians' and they would know the 'Russian mentality' better
than anybody else. They would also be living proofs that Russians are
well integrated politically in their new homelands.
I know that some Soviet successor states (Kazakhstan for instance),
are consciously making use of ethnic ambassadors (Poles, Germans,
Koreans, etc.) in their respective 'external homelands' (Poland,
Germany, Korea, etc.)
Do you know of any cases in which also Russians have been used in this
capacity?
_________________________
If yes, do you think that this is an effective way of promoting
integration and greater understanding among the Soviet successor
states, or will it be contemptuously brushed aside by Russian
authorities as pure tokenism?
_________________________
5. Can you think of any other ways in which Russian minority members
or Russian minority groups in the non-Russian Soviet successor states
may contribute to/impede regional promotion which I haven't thought
of?
_________________________
6. Anything else you would like to add?
_________________________
Thank you very much for your cooperation. It is greatly appreciated
and will be acknowledged in the article which I am about to write.
sincerely yours,
Pal Kolsto
University of Oslo
-------------
Professor Pal Kolsto
Dept. of East European and Oriental Studies
University of Oslo
Box 1030, Blindern
N-0315 Oslo, Norway
tel (+47) 22 85 67 99/22 85 67 97
fax (+47)22 85 41 40
home address: Ramsvig 50 g
N-4015 Stavanger, Norway
tel/fax home (+47) 51 56 20 82
e-mail [email protected]
--
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