Re: Meskhetians in Krasnodar Territory
From: MINELRES moderator <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 1998 11:44:37 +0200 (EET)
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Meskhetians in Krasnodar Territory
From: MINELRES moderator <[email protected]>
Original sender: Alexander Ossipov <[email protected]>
Re: Meskhetians in Krasnodar Territory
Dear Mr. Martirosyan,
The discussion on the Meskhetian case is too interesting to be
interrupted. I was to a certain degree puzzled that you had voiced in
general the position of the Krasnodar authorities as it had been in
1991-1996, before Kondratenko (the new governor Nikolai
Kondratenko has brought some new elements to the official rhetoric).
Some new remarks might be added. First I should clarify a few points.
Anyway, I think, we should not pay much attention to any declarations
of Russian federal, Turkish or Georgian authorities. What they do is
much more important than what they say. On the one hand, in general
they do not want to be involved in any complicated or conflict
situations and hence desire to decline responsibility; on the other
they must take care of their image and imitate some activity.
We select the Meskhetians in Krasnodar as a cathegory which
requires a special protection at the moment not because of our
advocacy for any 'collective rights' or because of any special
sympathy with Meskhetians as such. I always say, that our
organisation does not protect any minorities, we are tackling
discrimination on ethnic ground. The Meskhetians have been selected
by the regional authorities as an object for definite and deliberate
discriminatory policies; there were at least two normative acts which
established a special regime for Turks, who became in Krasnodar a
specific quasi-estate. I should remind, that disfranchisement on ethnic
ground was not practised in Russia (USSR) since Stalin's period.
Actually, the basic problem, i.e. the Krasnodar 'nationalities policies'
is wider than the Meskhetian case itself, but the latter at the moment
is the focal issue. Moreover, the Meskhetians are under a direct threat
of ethnic cleansing and eviction.
The issues of identity, the degree of alienation from this or that country
or society require special and endless disputes. Legal criteria are
more adequate in this case. The Meskhetians are citizens or RF in
accordance with the law on citizenship. Hundreds of Turks with whom
is talked in Krasnodar consider themselves Russian citizens. It is
rather a strange situation, when someone, for instance a Russian or
Turkish official, reasons where, to which country or region a Russian
citizen residing in Russia must go and where must not, where he/she
is allowed to live and where is not.
I deal with the Krasnodar problems since 1990, since 1994 I spend
annually much time in Krasnodar and Stavropol territories. I am not a
sociologist, I haven't hold any formalised surveys, but many times
visited all the districts where Turks lived, interviewed hundreds of
various persons, and I guess, this fact allows me to evaluate some
widespread opinions about 'conflicts', migration, public opinion,
Cossacks etc. A number of myths look very convincing for many
people, and it is a real pity.
Myth 1. Krasnodar territory is suffering from 'tremendous' influx of
migrants. Meanwhile, in 1996 migrational input was 53,2 thousand,
the total population growth was 26,3 thousand, and the region's total
population was 5,07 mln. I do not have the data for 1997 yet, but the
migrational influx has been gradually declining since 1993. Migrants
do not concentrate in any particular districts or cities. Around 85%
are ethnic Slavs. Anyway, the regional authorities radicalise their
rhetoric against migrants and implement new rstrictive measures.
Such regions of Russia as Belgorod, Orenburg, Saratov, Astrakhan
accept much more migrants per 1,000 of permanent population than
Krasnodar does, but one can hardly find analogous policies and
official rhetorics in that particular provinces. Thus, anti-migration
policies is a matter of political choice. Migrants and some particular
minorities like Meskhetians are very suitable scapegoats...
Myth 2. Krasnodar has a great potential for ethnic conflict. Thus, the
regional administration follows the public opinion. If it has not any
pressure from below if won't challenge the federal legislation. It has
been demonstrated many times in various cases that confrontation
against the federal centre as well as regionalistic rhetoric have been
weighty political resources for republican or provincial authorities in
Russia. This general tendency is being individualised in various cases.
One can hardly talk about any public opinion in Krasnodar or
elsewhere in Russia. It invented, constructed and voiced by the
authorities, media and some corporations (like Cossacks). In
Krasnodar the media is totally under the governor's control, the
Cossacks are closely associated with the regional government. The
same for 'ethnic conflicts'. By the way, the territory has in general
etnically homogenious population (86% Russians in 1997, no compact
settlements of minorities). I know only three cases which took place in
1990-92 and could be characterised as local conflicts without Cossack
involvement. The rest appr. 14-15 cases within the last 7 years are
samples of aggression on ethnic ground of the extremist paramilitary
groups, which called themselves Cossacks. It seems to me that
anyway one should not confuse aggression of 'ultras' and the
populations' attitude. The major feature of the local population is
conformist behaviour. The Turks live in Krasnodar, Stavropol, Rostov
or elsewhere peacefully side by side with Russians or Armenians.
Some people sympathise with Turks, some dislike them, some are
indifferent. But in any case if something happens no one would do
anything or even raise voice to protect their neighbours. Obviously,
nobody will argue against the official propaganda.
Myth 3. The Cossackhood is a real force, the government cannot but
takes it into account. The Cossacks are a force because they are
perceived as a force. They did not ever have a chance of demonstrating
their abilities and capacities. In 1994 the All-Kuban Cossack Army took
an active part in the electoral campaign. What was the result? Only 4
deputies of 50 within the regional legislature identify themselves as
Cossack avtivists, the same proportions are within the municipalities.
Why the authorities support militarised radical politics is a special
issue. One should also remember the Tabaksovhoz case of 1995 -
when the risk of criminal prosecution against Cossacks after one
porgom became real, the 'heroes' kept silence and did not do
anything to help their detained fellow.
Myth 4. Russian forced migrants have very aggressive nationalist
feelings against non-Slav, in particular Moslems and 'Caucasians' in
general. A great deal of Russians from Chechnia in Krasnodar makes
the region flammable. No proof. In general Russian forced migrants
have never demonstrated their sympathy toward radical politics and
extremist thought. Besides, I can use my own impressions from the
Starvropol Territory. There are a number of organisations established
by Russians from Chechnia. Nationalist inclination is existent and
obvious, but not of an extremist type. Anyway, migrants from
Chechnia constituted around 15% of the total migration inflow in
Krasnodar in 1995-96. It is not too much.
I understand a scepticism towards human rights organisations.
However, I hope that all of us prefer pragmatic rather than idealistic
approach. The trouble is how to interpret the word 'pragmatism'.
Concession to the paramilitary extremist organisation, i.e. deportation
(being diplomatic - 'resettlement') of the Meskhetian Turks from
Krasnodar seems to me rather a strange way of 'conflict management'.
It is not a hard task to drive 13,5 thousand Turks (0,3% of the
territory's population, 6% [8,500] in Krymsk district, the place of their
'compact' settlement) away to some other provinces (meanwhile it
would be the third deportation for these people within the last 55
years). But it won't be the end of the story. The regional government
and the Cossacks also hate Armenians, Georgians, Assyrians, Kurds,
other 'Caucasians', Jews, organised settlers from Siberia and the Far
East; the chief of AKCA spoke against Greeks, the governor
Kondratenko at the last session of the Council of Federation spoke
against the local Germans. Who will be the next after Turks? It is
obvious that nobody will provide any funds for the deportation (pardon -
'resettlement') - neither the Russian government nor IOM, UNHCR,
CE, etc. Even if this occurs anyhow, it is also clear for everybody who
know the Russian realities that the money will never reach the people
whom it is addressed to. Is it a pragmatic approach?
However, almost all of the modern 'ethnic cleansings' were justified
and rationalised by that goal of 'conflict prevention', including the 1915
events in Anatolia.
The strategy of settlement by concessions often called 'constructive'
or 'pragmatic' approach is widely spread, though concessions as a
response to pressure, threats and blackmail usually provoke new and
more aggressive demands. It is no doubt for me that when the
Krasnodar authorities declare that they will expell Turks by all
available means, thay launch a touchstone. Silent agreement with
their 'constructive' approach will provoke ethnic cleansing. The
modern Russian history offers a number of good examples: the
Gorbachev government was affected by the 'spirit of Munchen', and
the same is true for the Russian authorities. This approach is very
popular among the officials and it is not supprising. If one insists on
legalist approach and tries to do something, and if something bad
occurs, the respective official must be blamed for it. If he/she does
not do anything but talks about 'constructive' approach and 'conflict
prevention', the same negative output can be explained by some
'objective processes', and the official is worth encouragement.
Bureaucratic logic is clear; what's about conflict managers' thought?
However, the Krasnodar problem was not caused by any human rights
organisation or the Meskhetian 'ethnonationalist agenda' (in Krasnodar
the 'Vatan' society did not demonstrate any substantial activity in this
field since 1989). The key problem from the very beginning was the
state's tradition of social engineering (including 'regulation of interethnic
relations' and 'conflict prevention'), based on the philosophy 'political
(administrative) expediency is uber alles' (in Russian 'zakon chto
dyshlo'). Our country possesses a very fertile soil for such an
approach, moreover, our people traditionally like 'scientific' justifications.
At least what is more pragmatic: to deport ('resettle') 13,5 thousand
men and women or to neutralise 3 - 3,5 thousand more or less active
members of extremist paramilitary AKCA? The only force which is
able correct the regional government's behaviour, is the Russian
federal authorities. They can and they must do that. International
campaign is the thing that can make them willing to do so. My
appeal is - join the campaign!
Sincerely,
Alexander Ossipov
The Memorial Human Rights Centre,
programme officer
Maly Karetny per. 12, Moscow, 103051, Russia
tel 7 095 282 08 16
fax 7 095 209 57 79
e-mail: <[email protected]>
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